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Abstract
The paper analyzes the eﬀects of a regionally coordinated proﬁtt a xi na
model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and
a globally mobile ﬁrm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to
two types of welfare gains. First, for investments that would take place in the
region in the absence of coordination, this measure can transfer location rents
from the ﬁrm to the union. Second, by internalizing all of the union’s beneﬁts
from foreign direct investment, a coordinated policy attracts more investment
than when member states act in isolation. Consequently, tax levels may rise
or fall under regional coordination.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is frequently argued that the increasing international mobility of ﬁrms is a main
reason for the signiﬁcant fall in corporate tax rates worldwide.1 The more footloose
the factor, the more easily it can avoid taxation through migration to a tax haven.
Consequently, greater mobility intensiﬁes the competition between jurisdictions in
reducing taxes in order to attract corporate investment. In the European Union,
these developments have led to an intense debate on whether corporate taxation
should be formally coordinated between member states. The Ruding Report (1992)
made far-reaching harmonization proposals, including a recommendation for a min-
imum statutory corporation tax of 30 per cent. These proposals have not, however,
been endorsed by EU member states. One of the main counterarguments has been
that, as a consequence of the limits on tax competition within the EU, internation-
ally mobile ﬁrms might exit the region altogether and settle in third countries.
As an alternative to the Ruding proposals, in 1998 the EU council adopted a Code
of Conduct for business taxation in which member states commit themselves to
refrain from ‘unfair’ tax policies that discriminate against (less mobile) domestic
ﬁrms in favour of (more mobile) multinational ﬁrms (see European Communities,
1998). A parallel initiative against discriminatory corporate tax policies has been
launched by the OECD (1998). It is by no means clear, however, that this measure
will prove suﬃcient to prevent tax competition for internationally mobile ﬁrms.2
For example, in response to the Code of Conduct, Ireland will introduce a general
corporate income tax rate of 12.5 per cent as of 2003, thus all of its EU competitors
by a margin of more than 10 percentage points.3 Moreover, with the enlargement of
the EU beginning in 2004, a number of Eastern European countries with corporate
1Statutory corporate tax rates have declined from an OECD average of almost 50 per cent in
1980 to roughly 35 percent in 2000. If eﬀective average rates of corporation tax are considered, and
account is thus taken of simultaneous changes in the corporate tax base, the reduction is somewhat
less, but is nonetheless substantial. See Devereux, Griﬃth and Klemm, 2001.
2Keen (2002) has recently shown that a non-discrimination policy may even be counterproduc-
tive, because it extends the range of tax bases over which countries compete.
3In the past, Ireland has given preferential tax treatment to multinational ﬁrms by means of a
split corporate tax rate.
1income tax rates well below the average of the current EU members will enter the
internal market. With these changes, it seems almost certain that the debate on
a more far-reaching harmonization of corporate tax systems in the EU will be re-
opened in the coming years.
Against this background, the present paper analyzes the implications of a regionally
coordinated, corporate-income tax in a model with three active countries, one of
which is outside the region, and a proﬁt-making ﬁrm that is freely mobile interna-
tionally. The analysis builds on two diﬀerent strands in the literature.
The ﬁrst group of papers deals with the issue of tax coordination in such a three-
country model, but focussing on the competition to attract capital. This factor of
production earns a normal rate of return. In an inﬂuential paper, Razin and Sadka
(1991) have shown that tax coordination between two (inﬁnitely) small countries
will yield no welfare gains and a zero tax policy is optimal for the coordinating
region, if cooperation with the (large) rest of the world is not feasible. However, a
coordinated tax increase in a subgroup of countries that is able to inﬂuence the world
rate of return will be welfare improving. This result holds if tax rates are strategic
complements so that countries that are not part of the agreement will ﬁnd it in their
own self-interest to raise domestic tax rates as well (see Konrad and Schjelderup,
1999). Similarly, in the presence of diﬀerential transaction costs for investments
within the EU and in third countries, Huizinga and Nielsen (2000) show that a tax
increase in an EU tax haven will increase welfare in the EU partner country, despite
the presence of an outside tax haven. Finally, Sørensen (2000, 2001)c a r r i e so u ta
set of simulation analyses in an extended, asymmetric model where countries diﬀer
from each other and distributional eﬀects arise within each country. His calculations
conﬁrm the qualitative result that a coordinated increase in capital tax rates among
the EU members will be beneﬁcial for the union as a whole, but they also show
that regional tax coordination promises only a fraction of the gains that could be
achieved by worldwide tax coordination.
A second strand of the literature analyzes the eﬀects of tax competition for inter-
nationally mobile, proﬁt-making ﬁrms when the location of a ﬁrm causes spillover
eﬀects in the independent, potential-host countries. Examples of positive spillovers
are scale economies in the provision of public goods (Black and Hoyt, 1989), the ex-
2istence of regional unemployment (Haaparanta, 1996), or vertical industry linkages
that reduce the production costs of existing ﬁrms (Haaland and Wooton, 1999). In
these settings, a subsidy competition for the ﬁrm will result, if the potential host
countries have similar characteristics.4 When trade costs are incorporated in this
type of model, ﬁrms will have an incentive to locate either in the larger market
(Hauﬂer and Wooton, 1999) or in the country that already hosts an agglomeration
(Kind et al., 2000). The host country may then be able to levy a positive tax on
mobile ﬁrms in equilibrium, even if it beneﬁts from the investment. All these mod-
els consider only two competing regions, however, and none explicitly addresses the
issue of regional tax coordination.5
These two strands are brought together in the present analysis. We consider unilat-
eral and regional tax policy for a region of two countries that competes with a third
potential-host country for the location of a monopolistic ﬁrm. Location rents arise
from transport costs being lower within the region than between the region and the
outside country. In this setting, we show that regional tax coordination may lead
to two types of welfare gains. First, in situations where the ﬁrm’s location rent in
the region is large, eliminating tax competition within the region allows an increase
in the equilibrium tax, leading to a transfer of location rents from the ﬁrm to the
regional governments. Second, in situations where the ﬁrm has no strong preference
between locating within the region or in the outside country, a coordinated reduction
in the tax oﬀered to the ﬁrm will attract additional, welfare-enhancing investments.
In this case, regional integration overcomes a free-riding problem when both coun-
tries in the region beneﬁt from the investment. Taken together, these results imply
that the direction of tax change under regional coordination is ambiguous in our
model. This contrasts with the seemingly clear-cut policy prescription in favour of a
coordinated tax increase derived in the earlier literature on regional tax coordina-
4Conversely, non-cooperative capital taxation may lead to excessively high tax rates when the
location of a ﬁrm causes negative externalities for the host country, for example by polluting its
environment (see Markusen et al., 1995).
5An informal argument about the potential beneﬁts of regional tax coordination in such a setting
is made in Keen (1993, pp. 33-34). Keen argues that only a coordinated tax policy will be able to
capture regional location rents that are not speciﬁc to a particular country. As our formal analysis
will show, this is but one of the possible welfare gains that can arise from regional coordination.
3tion, and may explain the hesitation of policy-makers in the EU to enact minimum
corporate tax rates or similar harmonization policies.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, describing in turn the
behaviour of households, ﬁrms, and governments. Section 3 considers the benchmark
case where all countries (both countries in the region and the outside country)
compete to host the monopolist. Section 4 analyzes the eﬀects of tax coordination
between the two countries in the region. Section 5 discusses our results and compares
them to related literature. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider tax policy in three countries i ∈ {A,B,C},w h e r ec o u n t r i e sAa n dB
are located in the same region while country C lies outside the union.6 The three
countries compete for the location of a single ﬁrm that is a monopoly supplier in
the world market and has its home base outside the active countries considered in
the model. Due to high plant-speciﬁcc o s t s ,t h eﬁr mw i l ls e tu pi no n l yo n eo ft h e
countries A, B and C, and serve the other markets from this base. Location matters
because of transport costs, which diﬀer between the two countries in the region and
the outside country.7
2.1 Households
There are two consumption goods in each country, the good produced by the mo-
nopolist (x), and a numeraire good (z) produced in a perfectly competitive market.
Consumers in all countries are identical and have quadratic, quasi-linear preferences
of the form





i + zi ∀ i ∈ {A,B,C}. (1)
6In the following we refer to countries A and B equivalently as a ‘region’ or ‘union’ of coun-
tries. The latter term may imply that the two countries may have agreed on some form of policy
coordination other than the issue under discussion here, but such pre-existing arrangements have
no consequences for our analysis.
7This set-up extends our earlier analysis in Hauﬂe ra n dW o o t o n( 1999).
4In all countries, each household inelastically supplies one unit of labour, receiving
the wage wi. Denoting consumer prices by qi and letting ti/ni be per-capita tax




= zi + qi xi ∀ i ∈ {A,B,C}. (2)
In the following we assume that countries A and B are of equal size and that the
population in each of these countries is normalized to unity (nA = nB ≡ 1). The pop-
ulation of the outside country C is nC ≡ n. Thus our analysis allows for exogenous
variations in the relative size of the regional market (A+B) vis-à-vis country C.
Maximizing (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) and aggregating over households












Labour is the only input in the production of both goods. The production func-
tion for the numeraire good (z)i st h es a m ei na l lc o u n t r i e sa n dt h i sg o o di sf r e e l y
traded with no transport costs. This ensures that wage rates will be equalized across
countries (wi = w).
In contrast, commodity x is produced by a monopolist8 that has its home base
outside of countries A, B and C.9 It is well known that the decision whether to ex-
port from the home base or engage in foreign direct investment will depend on the
comparison between trade costs and ﬁx e ds e t - u pc o s t s( H o r s t m a na n dM a r k u s e n ,
1992). Since little can be gained from restating these conditions in the present con-
text, we simply assume that ﬁrm-speciﬁcs e t - u pc o s t sa r es u ﬃciently low to make
8The monopoly assumption is needed to keep the model tractable analytically. In the context of
environmental tax competition, Rauscher (1995) introduces the same assumption in the oligopoly
m o d e lo fM a r k u s e ne ta l .( 1995). This simpliﬁcation allows Rauscher to derive analytical results
without changing the qualitative implications of the model.
9This implies that the monopolist’s proﬁts will not enter the calculations of any of the active
countries. The case where the monopolist is partly or wholly owned by residents of countries A
a n dBi sd i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n5 .
5foreign direct investment proﬁtable, and plant-speciﬁc costs are suﬃciently high
so that all foreign direct investment is concentrated in a single production unit.
Finally, consumer arbitrage for the monopoly good x precludes the ﬁrm from price-
discriminating between markets.10
In this setting consumer prices will diﬀer across countries by the amount of the
transport costs. There is a ﬁxed transport cost of τ per unit of good x shipped
between regions A and B. For trade between either of these countries and coun-
try C, the per-unit transport cost is σ. Transport costs should be interpreted in a
wide sense, incorporating all diﬀerences between countries that make market inte-
gration imperfect. Throughout the analysis we assume σ > τ.D i ﬀerent arguments
can be given to support this speciﬁcation. The two markets in the region may be
geographically closer to each other than to the third country; there may be fewer
administrative hurdles for trade between them; or the two markets in the region
may be more similar, so that locating in one reduces the information cost of selling
in the other.
The ﬁrm’s optimal producer price will generally depend on the country in which
the investment takes place. Let this location-speciﬁc producer price be denoted by
pi. Adding the relevant level of transport costs gives the following set of consumer
prices in country j (qji):
qAA = pA,q BA = pA + τ,q CA = pA + σ FDI in A,
qAB = pB + τ,q BB = pB,q CB = pB + σ FDI in B,
qAC = pC + σ,q BC = pC + σ,q CC = pC FDI in C. (4)
The ﬁrm’s proﬁts from operations in location i depend on the mark-up over wage
costs that can be charged, multiplied by worldwide sales under the resulting con-
sumer prices. From these gross proﬁts, ﬁxed plant-speciﬁc costs must be deducted.
We assume that these are the same across all countries and equal to F. Finally,
each country levies a lump-sum tax ti, which can be positive or negative. The tax
instrument thus incorporates both direct investment subsidies paid to the ﬁrm and
10This assumption is motivated by the increasing opportunities for individuals to cross-border
shop via the Internet or through other low-cost forms of remote purchases.
6(cash ﬂow) taxes on pure proﬁts.11
Hence, net proﬁts in location i are
πi =( pi − w)
X
j
Xj(qji) − F − ti ∀ i,j ∈ {A,B,C}. (5)
Substituting the market demand curves (3) and the set of consumer prices (4) into (5)

























FDI in C . (6)
Equation set (6) clearly shows that the optimal producer price is negatively related
to the aggregate transportation costs incurred for worldwide sales from any given
production base.
Substituting (6) back into (5) yields optimized proﬁts for each location. Due to
symmetry, these are identical in countries A and B. In the following we adopt the
convention, with no loss of generality, that the ﬁrm always locates in country A
whenever it decides to set up production in the region. It is then suﬃcient to compare






















− F − tC. (7)
Subtracting these two values from each other yields the net proﬁt surplus that can






[σ(2 − n) − τ] Θ
2β
− tA + tC, (8)
11In practice, location subsidies are often granted to the ﬁrm by selling land below market price,
or by providing public infrastructure for which the ﬁrm is not charged. Note also that introducing
(more realistic) proportional proﬁt taxes would complicate the algebra, but change none of our
results.
12T h r o u g h o u tt h ea n a l y s i s ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h em a r k e ts i z ep a r a m e t e rα is suﬃciently large,












From eq. (6) we can infer that Θ =[ ( p∗
A − w)+( p∗
C − w)] is the mark-up of prices
over wage costs in both countries. Hence Θ must always be positive.
The ﬁrm will be indiﬀerent between locating in countries A and C if π∗
A − π∗
C =0 .
From (8) we can then deﬁne Γ a st h e‘ t a xp r e m i u m ’t h a tt h eﬁrm is willing to pay
for locating in country A vs. country C:
Γ ≡ tA − tC where Γ =
[σ(2 − n) − τ] Θ
2β
. (10)
The sign of this tax premium is ambiguous in general. Country A can charge a
higher tax than country C and still leave the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between locations, if
the market of the third country is not larger than the regional market (n<2)a n d
transport costs within the region are low relative to transport costs to the third
country (τ << σ).
Figure 1 summarizes the parameter combinations under which the union country A
is able or unable to attract the investment in the absence of taxes and subsidies.
The ﬁgure is drawn for the parameter values α =2 .5, w =1and σ =1while
t h em a r k e ts i z eo fc o u n t r yC( n) and trade costs within the union (τ)a r ea l l o w e d
to vary. The boldface line in the graph gives the combinations of (n,τ) for which
the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between locating in the union and locating in country C. For
parameter combinations below this line the ﬁrm will settle in the union, whereas it
will settle in country C for combinations above the line.13
2.3 Governments
Each government compares the welfare of its representative consumer in the scenar-
ios where it is host to the ﬁrm to the case where good x has to be imported from
abroad. Due to international diﬀerences in transport costs, it also matters for each
13It is directly inferred from Figure 1 that further economic integration in the union (deﬁned as
a reduction in τ) increases the likelihood of country A attracting the foreign direct investment (cf.
Motta and Norman, 1996).
8Figure 1:
9of countries A and B whether good x is imported from the neighbouring country in
the union or from the outside country C. To compute the welfare levels for coun-
try A when the ﬁrm locates in country i (uA,i), we use the budget constraint (2) to
substitute out for zi in the utility function (1) and employ (3), (4) and (6). Noting
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The welfare expressions for country B are analogous, while there are only two dif-
ferent welfare levels for country C, since that country is indiﬀerent as to whether
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These equations determine the best oﬀer (i.e., the minimum tax) that each country
is willing to make to the ﬁrm in order to attract the investment. For country A
the tax depends upon whether the ﬁrm would otherwise locate in its union partner
country B or in the outside country C. In the former case, the minimum tax is
obtained by equating uAA and uAB in (11a) and (11b), whereas in the latter case
the minimum tax equalizes uAA and uAC [eqs. (11a) and (11c)]. Denoting these











−[(3n +2 ) σ + τ]
8β(n +2 )
(





10Both of these expressions are unambiguously negative [cf. eq. (9)], indicating coun-
try A’s willingness to subsidize the ﬁrm in order to save transport on costs.
To answer the question as to which alternative location induces a higher subsidy
from country A, we calculate
µAC − µAB =
−[(3n +2 ) σ − (2n +3 ) τ]
8β(n +2 )
(
2(α − w) − σ −




Again, it can be shown that the term in the braces in (14) is unambiguously positive.
For n>1 this implies that µAC − µAB < 0, and the minimum tax oﬀered by
country A will be lower if the ﬁrm otherwise locates in country C. If n<1, however,
the ﬁrm’s producer price will be lower when it locates in country C rather than in
one of the union countries. If, in addition, the transport cost diﬀerential (σ − τ)i s
suﬃciently small, then µAC − µAB > 0 and country A oﬀers a lower tax if the ﬁrm
would otherwise locate in country B.
For country C, equating uCC and uCA in (12a) and (12b) gives this country’s mini-
mum tax
µCA = µCB =
−n[(6 + n)σ − τ]
8β(2 + n)
(





which is also unambiguously negative.
3 Tax competition between all countries
To determine the equilibrium location of the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm’s comparison of net
proﬁts [eq. (10)] must be combined with the diﬀerent minimum taxes oﬀered by
the competing countries. We adopt a simple bidding approach where all countries
know the location preferences of the ﬁrm, as given by (10), and continuously increase
their oﬀers (i.e, reduce their proﬁt taxes). In equilibrium, the ﬁrm will locate in the
country where its net-of-tax proﬁts are (marginally) higher than those in any other
location, and neither of the countries failing to get the investment has an incentive
to reduce its proﬁt tax further.
We ﬁrst consider the competition between countries A and C, ignoring for now the
intra-union tax competition between A and B. We denote by κ,t h ecritical tax
11that is required to get the investment in country A. This is derived by substituting
country C’s best oﬀer µCA [eq. (15)] into eq. (10). This gives




[(8 − 6n − 3n
2)σ − (4 + n)τ] Θ −





where Θ > 0 is given in (9). This critical tax will be negative if n ≥ 1. However, it
is positive for suﬃciently low levels of both n and τ,i nw h i c hc a s et h eﬁrm has a
strong incentive to settle in the union.
In order for country A to attract the ﬁrm, the critical tax must exceed the best oﬀer
(maximum subsidy) of country A, otherwise the ﬁrm will locate in C. Hence the
ﬁrm will invest in the union if and only if κ − µAC > 0.F r o m( 16) and (13b) we
calculate
κ − µAC =
{[(10 − 3n(n +1 ) ] σ − (3 + n)τ} Θ
4β(n +2 )
+
τ[σ(2 − 3n − n2)+τ(n +1 ) ]
4β(n +2 ) 2 .
(17)
In Figure 2 this condition is shown graphically by the new line that cuts the hori-
zontal axis at n ≈ 1.38. To the left of this line, the diﬀerence is positive and the ﬁrm
locates in the union despite intra-union tax competition. In comparison to the sce-
nario without taxes and subsidies (Figure 1), the likelihood of the union attracting
the investment is unambiguously lower, as indicated by the shaded area. This is be-
cause, for n>1, country C will be willing to oﬀer a higher subsidy than country A,
as it has the higher absolute savings in transport costs (Hauﬂer and Wooton, 1999).
In the cases where country A still attracts the investment, the remaining question
is which tax level it can charge the ﬁrm. If (17) is positive then oﬀe r i n gat a x
marginally below κ will suﬃce to outbid country C. But, this does not take account
of tax competition within the union. Since countries A and B are symmetric, the
best oﬀers they can make to the ﬁrm are the same. Country A must oﬀer at least
the tax µAB in order to prevent the ﬁrm from locating in country B. Hence, the
equilibrium tax charged by country A when it is host to the ﬁrm is
t
∗
A = min{µAB, κ} .
Since µAB < 0 from (13a), this minimum condition implies that the equilibrium
12Figure 2:
13Figure 3:
tax is always negative for a union country that successfully attracts the ﬁrm in the
presence of intra-union tax competition.
Figure 3 shows which of the two tax levels is binding for diﬀerent sets of parameter
values. In this graph only parameter combinations to the left of the µAC = κ line
are relevant, since country A will not attract the investment in the remaining cases.
If, starting from any point on the µAC = κ line, the size of country C is gradually
reduced while τ is held constant, the regime where country C’s tax oﬀer imposes
the binding constraint will be reached ﬁrst, implying t∗
A = κ.I fn is further reduced,
intra-union tax competition becomes the binding constraint and t∗
A = µAB.
144 Regional tax coordination
We now consider the case where the union countries A and B coordinate their
policies and jointly make a tax oﬀer to the ﬁrm. This oﬀer will take into account the
combined beneﬁts to both countries of the ﬁrm locating in the region rather than
in country C. We maintain our convention that, if the ﬁrm invests in the union, it
settles in country A.
The maximum oﬀer made under this coordinated policy is thus the sum of µAC
in (13b) plus the beneﬁtt oc o u n t r yBo ft h eﬁrm locating in A rather than C. From
the symmetry of the two union countries, this latter beneﬁti se q u a lt oµAC − µAB,
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This minimum tax will be lower than the best oﬀer of country A if and only if coun-
try B beneﬁts from having the ﬁrm locate in A rather than C. From our discussion
of eq. (14) above, we know that this condition must always be fulﬁlled for n ≥ 1.
Given this oﬀer, the equilibrium condition for the ﬁrm to locate in the union is
κ − µU > 0. Computing this diﬀerence from (16) and (18) yields
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Figure 4 summarizes the parameter combinations for which this expression is posi-
t i v e .T h eu n i o nc o u n t r yw i l la t t r a c tt h eﬁrm for all values of (n,τ) to the left of the
line that cuts the horizontal axis at n =2 .F o rτ =0this is the same critical size of
country C as in the case without taxes and subsidies (see Figure 1).
The ﬁrst important diﬀerence to the case of intra-union tax competition (Figure 2)
is that the coordinated tax policy will never make a better oﬀer than is needed to
prevent the ﬁrm from locating in country C. In other words, the equilibrium tax in





16Therefore, in situations where the ﬁrm has a strong preference to locate in the
region and intra-union tax competition imposed the binding constraint on country
A’s tax oﬀer, a coordinated tax policy will lead to a higher tax in equilibrium,
and thus transfer some location rents from the ﬁrm to the treasuries of the union
countries. This is the lightly shaded area in Figure 4, which corresponds to the
regime t∗ = µAB in Figure 3. If the outside country is suﬃciently small, then κ may
actually be positive [cf. eq. (16)] and the union will be able to charge a positive tax
from the ﬁrm. This cannot occur with intra-union tax competition where, as we saw
above, the equilibrium tax will always be negative.
Second, in comparison to the case of intra-union tax competition the union recap-
tures the investment for the set of parameter combinations indicated by the darkly
shaded area. In all of these cases, country B beneﬁts from having the investment in
A, rather than in C, and hence the coordinated tax oﬀer µU is lower than country A’s
isolated tax oﬀer µAC. Welfare gains to the union can thus be obtained by oﬀering
a lower tax to the ﬁrm, as compared to the case where individual member states
submit separate bids. In this scenario the additional location rent to the union,
relative to the case of intra-union tax competition, lies in the diﬀerence between
the equilibrium tax that must be oﬀered to the ﬁrm (t∗
A = κ), and the minimum
coordinated tax that the union is willing to oﬀer (µU).
Lying between these two cases where regional tax coordination is welfare increasing
(but with opposite implications for the direction of the coordinated tax reform),
there is a set of parameter combinations where tax coordination has no eﬀect. This
is the white area in between the two shaded ones in Figure 4, which corresponds to
the regime t∗ = κ in Figure 3. Here the union will be able to attract the ﬁrm even
if all countries compete against each other, and the binding constraint on the host
country’s tax level stems from the tax oﬀer made by the outside country.
5 Discussion
We ﬁrst compare our results with those of earlier work on regional tax coordination
in a three-country setting (Konrad and Schjelderup, 1999; Huizinga and Nielsen,
2000; Sørensen, 2000, 2001). A common result of these analyses and ours is that tax
17coordination is collectively beneﬁcial for the region that undertakes the agreement.
However, in the previous literature welfare-improving tax coordination always leads
to an increase in the rates of capital taxation, which reduces the deadweight loss
of the tax system. In our model this is only one of two possible scenarios, and tax
coordination may also involve a reduction in the tax oﬀered to a monopolistic ﬁrm.
This latter policy may yield welfare gains because all of the beneﬁts from attracting
foreign direct investment to a region are internalized under tax coordination, in-
cluding those of countries that do not host the ﬁrm. Such spillovers on neighbouring
countries in the region are not captured by standard settings of capital tax competi-
tion, but arise in our model from diﬀerences in transport costs for trade within the
region and between the region and the outside world.
Relatedly, the previous literature typically ﬁnds that the countries outside the union
also beneﬁt from the regional increase in tax rates (see Konrad and Schjelderup,
1999; Sørensen, 2000, 2001). As a consequence, models of tax competition in com-
petitive capital markets predict that regions should share a common interest in
collectively raising capital tax rates, at least if they are suﬃciently similar in size
and other characteristics. This scenario raises the question why we do not observe
more intensive eﬀorts at worldwide tax coordination. In contrast, our setting intro-
duces potentially conﬂicting interests between the union and the outside country. In
particular, a coordinated tax reduction in the union will harm the outside country
by redirecting foreign direct investment towards the integrating region. Moreover,
this scenario becomes more likely when regions are similar in their suitability as
locations from the perspective of the ﬁrm, as the change in tax policy is then more
likely to tip the balance of the ﬁrm’s investment decision.
In the present model, savings in transport costs are the underlying motive for gov-
ernments trying to attract internationally mobile ﬁrm, and for the positive spillovers
that exist for other countries in the region. This motive could be replaced by tech-
nological linkages that exist between the production of the monopolistic ﬁrm and
the producers of other goods in the host country of the investment (see Haaland and
Wooton, 1999; Kind et al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2000). It could further be
argued that neighbouring countries will also experience some positive technological
spillover from the location of the ﬁrm. Such a setting should yield similar qualita-
18tive results for the eﬀects of regional tax coordination as does our speciﬁcation with
transport costs. Hence, the basic argument derived from our analysis is not conﬁned
t ot h ec a s ew h e r ea l lﬁrms produce ﬁnal consumer goods, but it can equally be
applied to tax competition for a ﬁrm producing specialized intermediate inputs.
We now discuss the likely eﬀects on our results of relaxing some of the underlying
assumptions of our model. We have excluded the proﬁts of the ﬁrm by assuming that
they accrue to the residents of a (fourth) country not explicitly considered in the
analysis. The ﬁrm’s proﬁts are clearly aﬀected by both forms of tax coordination.
They are reduced if the ﬁrm has a strong incentive to settle in the region, and the
union countries collectively increase taxes to extract more location rents from the
ﬁrm. In contrast, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts increase if the union countries collectively reduce
taxes in order to bid the ﬁrm away from country C. If the ﬁrm is partly owned by
residents of the union, then the union countries’ changes in tax revenue are partly
oﬀset by counteracting changes in private proﬁt income. This extension will reduce
the gains from a coordinated tax increase in the union, but it will increase the gains
from a coordinated tax reduction since the additional subsidies now partly accrue
to domestic residents.
The beneﬁts of regional tax coordination will also be aﬀected if lump-sum taxes and
subsidies are ruled out and distortionary taxes are the governments’ marginal source
of ﬁnance. Other things equal, this will put a premium on taxes raised from the ﬁrm
and therefore increase the gains from a coordinated tax increase. The reverse is also
true as this modiﬁcation imposes an extra cost on subsidies paid out to the ﬁrm,
and hence reduces the gains from a coordinated tax reduction. Note, however, that
these departures from our results work in the opposite direction to the introduc-
tion of proﬁt income accruing to residents of the union. Therefore, on the basis of
these two simpliﬁcations alone, a setting where lump-sum taxes exist and all proﬁt
income accrues to non-residents may be seen as a simple benchmark that does not
systematically bias the results in any particular direction.
196C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have argued that regional tax coordination in a setting with a mo-
nopolistic ﬁrm and an outside country can lead to two types of welfare gains for the
countries undertaking the agreement. First, for investments that would have taken
place in the union in the absence of coordination, coordination allows an increase in
equilibrium taxes, transferring location rents from the ﬁrm to the union countries.
Second, by internalizing the beneﬁts to all union members from the location of a
foreign production plant, the union as a whole may be able to attract the ﬁrm by
means of a lower tax (or higher subsidy), whereas non-cooperative tax policies of its
members would have caused the ﬁrm to settle outside the region.
These results seem to strengthen the policy case for a regional coordination of cor-
poration taxes. But the analysis has also shown that the direction that a regionally
coordinated tax reform should take is far from clear. Most of the policy discussion
in the EU, along with the results from previous research, suggest a coordinated
increase in corporation taxes. Yet the opposite conclusion is equally possible in a
world where countries outside the region are not part of the agreement. Hence, the
optimal coordinated policy for an integrated region such as the EU involves trading
oﬀ changes in the location rents that can be reaped from existing ﬁrms with those
associated with an increase or reduction in the number of ﬁrms that locate within
the region.
The trade-oﬀ just described holds for a scenario where only a single tax instrument
(the corporate income tax) is available to the union. In order to simultaneously
increase the location rents from existing ﬁrms and attract new ﬁrms to the region, a
richer set of tax instruments is needed. For example, a coordinated EU corporate tax
policy could consist of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc location subsidy, which ensures that foreign
direct investment with a positive net value to the union is indeed attracted, and a
coordinated tax on corporate proﬁts that avoids a mutual undercutting of individual
EU member states. In this case a coordinated EU tax policy would, however, use
similar discriminatory policies as have just been declared as ‘unfair’ at the level of
individual member states, and it is bound to create conﬂicts with the worldwide
non-discrimination standards set by the OECD.
20Finally, our analysis also holds some implications for the precise form that regional
tax coordination should take. Throughout, we have considered only the welfare ef-
fects that regional tax coordination has on the union as a whole, leaving aside the
issue of how these gains can be divided between individual member states. In par-
ticular, in situations where coordinated tax policy results in a lower tax than the
maximum bids of each individual country, the host country would need to receive
side-payments from its union partners in order to submit a bid that is suﬃciently
low to attract the ﬁrm to the region. The most straightforward way to overcome this
coordination problem would be by means of a centralized EU corporation tax. On
the other hand, the analysis has also shown that permitting bids by individual coun-
tries is a means of internalizing the positive spillovers that each country perceives
from the location of mobile ﬁrms. A centralized EU corporation tax would eliminate
this preference-revelation mechanism. Hence while this instrument could lead to an
eﬃcient distribution of ﬁrms between the EU and the rest of the world, it does not
simultaneously guarantee an eﬃcient distribution of ﬁrms between individual EU
member states.
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